Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997

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of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high points of the book. Obando does an especially fine job reviewing the successes and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug policies.

Addicted to Failure effectively raises several significant issues for the reader to mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug policy been a costly failure that has made the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier? Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats to the United States beyond those associated with drug trafficking? If the current policies are counterproductive, what are the correct policies? Loveman does not provide convincing answers to the first two questions and does not address the third.

At the end of the day, Addicted to Failure is a book that should not be disregarded. It encourages readers to plunge deeper into the complexities of South America. For while Loveman and his authors may not offer any answers, it is clear that the United States will face increasingly complex challenges from this part of the world in the years ahead.

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In Shining Path Lewis Taylor provides compelling evidence that the attitude of the people can be decisive in war. That point will not surprise students of warfare; they will recall that two great strategists stressed the central importance of having the people on your side. Focusing primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl von Clausewitz coined the notion that war’s dominant tendencies make a “paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole comprises primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, a blind natural force. The passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people.” Concentrating on guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung famously wrote that “in the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish that inhabit it.”

In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to understand and respect the rural population on the parts of the guerrillas (the Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”) led by Abimael Guzmán and of the government of Peru came close to dooming the efforts of both sides in the bloody conflict. After the end of hostilities, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that more than sixty-nine thousand Peruvians had been killed in the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the Shining Path responsible for the majority of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao made clear that the end of warfare was not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor shows how close the combatants came, through their own excesses, to defeating their own causes.

Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin American sociology at the University of Liverpool, does not adequately highlight the strategic implications of his subject. In fact, reading his book leaves unanswered the questions of why he wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses his study narrowly on the northern highlands of Peru, which were a particularly brutal locus of armed action. Although he acknowledges that generalized
violence occurred in 1992 in twenty-one of Peru’s twenty-four departments, he ignores other important areas of the conflict. He also writes as though the war in Peru proceeded without an international context, except for the intellectual contribution of Mao Tse-tung. True, the Cold War had ended by the time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán, but many observers think the agents could not have succeeded without the help of outside intelligence. In addition, U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs not only disrupted a source of support to the Shining Path but also relieved economic pressure on the government of Peru when it was sorely stressed by the conflict.

The Peruvian war provides insights for the future of revolutionary movements in Latin America—in countries with elected governments and when no support will be available from a Cuba or a Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold War. Fortunately, any reader interested in those issues, as well as in a systematic treatment of the strategic lessons of two decades of conflict in Peru, can find an excellent source in Cynthia McClintock’s 1998 Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path, published by the United States Institute of Peace Press.

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When a longtime Department of State attorney and former member of the prestigious International Law Commission takes the time to recount his considerable firsthand observations of the performance of the United Nations, Naval War College Review readers do well to take notice. At a time when a new U.S. geographic command is being stood up in Africa and military forces find their planning and operations centers increasingly visited by coalition, interagency, international, and nongovernmental organizational representatives, it is indispensable to have a clear understanding of the evolving role of the UN Security Council and its technical commissions and tribunal investigators. Matheson provides us with an insightful description, one that nicely serves that purpose.

The book is arranged in seven chapters and five appendixes. The first chapter provides a straightforward description of the UN Charter provisions that serve as the framework for action by the Security Council. It is complemented by chapter 2, which describes the council’s jurisdiction and mandate as the institution charged with the “primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.” The next three chapters provide general descriptions of the three principal modalities of Security Council actions: sanctions, peacekeeping and governance, and use of force. The growing importance of UN technical commissions is then described, followed by an examination of the UN role in prosecuting international crimes. The book is well indexed and includes summaries of some of the key council resolutions and a bibliography that will prove useful to those seeking more detailed coverage.
The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) – Shining Path (Spanish: Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso), more commonly known as the Shining Path (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso), is a revolutionary communist party and political organization in Peru following Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and Gonzalo Thought. When it first launched during the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, its goal was to overthrow the state by guerrilla warfare and replace it with a New Democracy. The Communist Party of Peru believed that