“The status quo will persist in the region for as long as we want it to.” The current situation will stay the way it is even for twenty or thirty years, until the Arabs agree to convert it into a “real peace” with Israel, in which normal relations will be established between the Arab states and Israel and extensive territorial changes will be made in Israel’s favor. Within the political echelon, it is agreed that “we will remain in the Territories and that is what will force the Arabs to change their position.” The Arab states and the residents of the Occupied Territories will reconcile themselves to the new status quo, even if it takes a long time.

These words describe with fair accuracy the policies of the government of Israel today, backed strongly in practice by Washington. The quoted parts are, however, taken from, and the rest a very close paraphrase of, Amnon Kapeliuk’s account of the “First and foremost among the myths that crumbled to their foundations in the Yom Kippur War” of October 1973, myths that he investigates in depth in his revealing study of the background for the October war and its immediate aftermath.

The October war – in Israel, “the Yom Kippur war” – was a traumatic event for Israel. It was a very close call that shattered the “conception” of Israeli might and Arab ineptitude that led Israel to near disaster and posed a threat of nuclear war. The myths did “crumble to their foundations,” as Kapeliuk reports. But over time they have been resuscitated in new forms, and may well lead on to further disasters.

Kapeliuk’s important study focuses mainly on the period from the 1967 war, which firmly established the myths, and the 1973 war, which shattered them – for a time. These were “years of nationalistic drunkenness and military triumphalism,”
in the words of historian Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Foreign Minister of Israel and a leading Israeli participant in peace negotiations, including Camp David 2000. The words also apply to Washington during the crucial years 1971-73, when Henry Kissinger had taken charge, displacing Secretary of State William Rogers. The period is a critical one in the history of Israel, with far broader global impact. What took place, and why, also provides many valuable lessons for today.

Israel’s stunning military victory in 1967 established U.S.-Israel relations in pretty much the form that has persisted since. As always in the region, its enormous energy resources were not far in the background. Since World War II Washington has regarded these resources as “a stupendous source of strategic power” and “one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” Prominent figures have recognized that control of Middle East oil would yield “substantial control of the world” and that America’s control over Middle East oil producers “gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies that are also dependent on energy exports from the region,” an insight that goes back to George Kennan. “By 1947,” historian Irene Gendzier comments, “the importance of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East to U.S. policy was beyond argument. Economic and strategic interests dominated calculations of U.S. policy, whether in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, or Lebanon.” And still do.

Control was threatened, it was felt, by secular Arab nationalism, based primarily in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. Nasser’s independence and role in the non-aligned movement were deeply disturbing to Washington and London. Syria was regarded in a similar light, also Iraq after British domination was overthrown in 1958. Israel’s severe blow to Nasser’s authority and power in 1967 was very welcome to Washington, and also to Saudi Arabia, Egypt’s main regional rival, then engaged in a proxy war with Egypt in North Yemen. The Kingdom was then and remains by far the most important of the oil states. It has also long been the center of extreme Islamic fundamentalism and has been very active throughout the Muslim world in propagating its radical Wahhabi doctrines. In the conflict between secular nationalism and radical Islam, the U.S. and Britain have regularly supported the latter, regarded as much less of a threat to their interests.

After its 1967 victory, Israel was granted the role of “strategic asset,” although its potential had been recognized as early as 1948. In that year and the year that followed, the U.S. warned Israel of the risks of relying exclusively on force to resolve the conflict over Palestine, alarmed by its territorial expansion and expulsion of Palestinian refugees. In the period following the 1967 war, its role was significantly enhanced, particularly in 1970, when Israel, at Washington’s behest, mobilized its forces to deter a possible Syrian intervention in Jordan to support Palestinians then being massacred by Jordanian forces during “Black September.” Syrian intervention was regarded as a threat to the Hashemite monarchy, and potentially to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. was so bogged down in Indochina that it was unable to act decisively. By then, Israel had found its natural place within the Nixon Doctrine, which recognized that the U.S. could “no longer play policeman to the world” and would therefore
“expect other nations to provide more cops on the beat in their own neighborhood” (Defense Secretary Melvin Laird). Police headquarters, it was understood, remain in Washington, with a branch office in London. The two main cops on the beat in the Middle East precinct were Israel and Iran (then under the Shah), informally allied.

Reviewing this system in 1974, Robert Reppa, a former Middle East analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote that Israeli power had protected the regimes of Jordan and Saudi Arabia from “a militarily strong Egypt” in the 1960s and that “the Israeli-Iranian interrelationship” continued to contribute to the stability of the region, securing U.S. interests. The picture was endorsed in May 1973 by the Senate’s ranking oil expert, Senator Henry Jackson, a strong supporter of Israel. He stressed “the strength and Western orientation of Israel on the Mediterranean and Iran [under the Shah] on the Persian Gulf,” two “reliable friends of the United States [who] have served to inhibit and contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab States … who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our principal sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf.”

There were precursors. In 1958, a critical year in the region, the National Security Council had concluded that a “logical corollary” of opposition to radical Arab nationalism “would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-Western power left in the Middle East,” the policy instituted after Israel’s 1967 victory.

Earlier, in the spring of 1949, Israel’s military successes had impressed the U.S. military, leading the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff to send a memo to the U.S. Joint Chiefs on the subject of “U.S. Strategic Interests in Israel,” in which he observed that Israel “has demonstrated by force of arms its right to be considered the military power next after Turkey in the Near and Middle East.” In the light of these developments, he concluded that “as the result of its support to Israel, the United States might now gain strategic advantages from the new political situation.”

The post-1967 arrangements fulfilled David Ben-Gurion’s aspiration for an “Alliance of the Periphery,” based on the triangle Israel-Iran-Turkey (allied with Israel, secretly, since 1958) and barring Nasserite and other secular nationalist tendencies as well as Soviet influence. The U.S. had refused to endorse this proposal in 1958, Ben-Ami reports, but the 1967 victory changed the strategic calculus.

Immediately after the June 1967 war, on June 19, the Israeli cabinet formulated a peace proposal calling for the return of captured Syrian and Egyptian territory but omitting the West Bank and Gaza, commonly claimed to have been a generous offer. It seems, however, to have been solely an internal document. According to Ben-Ami, “no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly,” and though the Americans were briefed, they “were not asked to convey [the proposal] to Cairo and Damascus as formal peace proposals.” And no reply was expected. Ben-Ami’s account is extended by Avi Raz in his detailed review of Israeli and U.S. archives. He concludes that the version given by Abba Eban, on which many scholars and writers have relied, “is nothing but a fiction,” and that the “the 19 June resolution was not a generous offer at all but a diplomatic maneuver to win over the one international player that really mattered to Israel – the United States,” with the primary objective
of heading off a “Soviet drive for a United Nations resolution demanding Israel immediately and unconditionally withdraw from the territories occupied in the war.”

The matter was quickly rendered moot by the initiation of the program of “creeping annexation” by new settlements in the Occupied Territories. The guiding doctrines were formulated by Moshe Dayan, the most influential figure throughout the post-1967 period who also rose to heroic status in the United States. As he explained in August 1971, “We must consider ourselves the permanent government in the Territories and plan and carry out as much as possible and not leave options open for the day when peace comes, which may be distant.”

Diplomatic efforts did not cease, but were still-born. In December 1969, Secretary of State Rogers made several proposals known as “the Rogers Plan,” calling for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory and an official end to the state of war. It was rejected by both Israel and Egypt.

In Egypt, in the interim, popular demonstrations intensified the massive frustration with the failure to arrive at a political solution to the Mid-East crisis, leading Nasser to launch the War of Attrition, beginning in March 1969. It escalated through the following February as Israeli forces reached into Egypt, leading Nasser to turn to the USSR for assistance. But, as Kapeliuk reminds us, “while the War of Attrition was at its height, Nasser began to ponder ways to end it.”

The Egyptian President made his views on the subject known in an important interview he granted on February 19, 1970, to the special Cairo correspondent of the French daily Le Monde, Eric Rouleau. In it Nasser expressed the view that “it will be possible to establish a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab countries, not excluding economic and diplomatic relations, at such time as a satisfactory solution will have been reached on the two sole problems that are the causes of the current conflict, the occupied territories and Palestinian refugees.” At the time, the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, rejected Nasser’s overture.

A major potential breakthrough took place in February 1971, in negotiations with UN mediator Gunnar Jarring. President Sadat of Egypt, who succeeded Nasser after his death, agreed to “enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242” of November 1967 (recognized on all sides, formally at least, to be the basic UN document – and, crucially, making no mention of Palestinian national rights), once Israel withdrew from the Sinai. Sadat also offered an interim settlement as a first stage.

“The combined significance of the Egyptian offers could not be overstated,” Israeli strategic analyst Zeev Maoz writes in his magisterial review of Israel’s security policies from 1948. But “blind and drunk throughout” (Ben-Ami), Israel rejected the offer, responding to Jarring that it “will not withdraw to the pre-June 1967 lines.” At the time, Israel was planning extensive development projects in the Egyptian Sinai, including a city (Yamit) and many settlements, while driving thousands of Bedouins into the desert, destroying towns and villages in preparation for these plans.

Sadat’s offer of a full peace treaty was supported by the U.S. State Department, but “they were up against two formidable enemies,” Maoz observes: “Golda Meir in Israel
and Henry Kissinger, the U.S. national security adviser." Ben-Ami writes that “It is difficult to imagine a greater gulf than that which existed between the resourceful peace strategist, the compulsively creative and far-sighted statesman that was Sadat, and the trivially immobile government led by Mrs Meir,” which rejected all offers while pursuing its ambitious programs of expansion into the Egyptian Sinai.

In earlier years, Israel had developed even more ambitious plans of expansion, but these were blocked by Washington. Not this time, however. Kissinger’s doctrines were no less “immobile” than Meir’s. In his memoirs eight years later, Kissinger outlines (and justifies) his policy of “stalemate”: no negotiations, just reliance on force, in which Israel reigned supreme, he assumed, adopting the triumphalism of the times. He also spells out his reasoning: it was necessary to insist upon “stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington … Until some Arab state showed a willingness to separate from the Soviets, or the Soviets were prepared to dissociate from the maximum Arab program, we had no reason to modify our policy” of stalemate.

It is hard to imagine that Kissinger was unaware that one of the two major Arab States, Saudi Arabia, did not even have diplomatic relations with the hated Russians, and that the other, Egypt, was plainly “showing a willingness to separate from the Soviets” – and shortly after even expelled Soviet advisers in a further effort to induce Washington to support the peace initiative. As for the Soviets, the question of their dissociating from the maximum Arab program did not even arise. They remained well within the international consensus to which, at the time, the U.S. still adhered. The matter was not obscure. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Middle East specialist Seth Tillman pointed out, “The official Soviet position has been consistent since 1948 in support of Israel’s right to exist and consistent since 1967 in support of Israel’s right to a secure national existence, as called for in Security Council Resolution 242, within its 1967 borders.”

Kissinger’s account of his decisions is so bizarre that one is tempted to suspect that the real issue was the “bureaucratic turf struggle” between Rogers and Kissinger to which Maoz alludes. The fact that he was willing to repeat these absurdities eight years later defies comment.

Kissinger won the “turf struggle,” replacing Rogers as Secretary of State, and took total control of foreign policy. At this point Sadat and peace were facing only “formidable enemies”: Israel and Kissinger. Nevertheless, he proceeded with further initiatives. All were dismissed or rebuffed. Not surprisingly, he was well aware of the unified front of rejectionism that he was facing. “Every door that I opened was slammed in my face by Israel with the blessing of the United States,” he informed the U.S. press a few months before he launched the war: “There was only one conclusion – if we do not take our fate into our own hands there will be no movement. Now is the time for a decision. The time has come for a shakeup … The Americans have left us no other way out.”

Sadat made it crystal clear that if peace was barred by Israeli immobilism and
Kissinger’s insistence on stalemate, he would have to turn to war. His warnings elicited mostly ridicule in the reigning atmosphere of “nationalistic drunkenness and military triumphalism.” Kapeliuk writes that “The Egyptian threats and the reports from Arab and foreign forces about the dangers of an Arab offensive against Israel were received by Israelis with ridicule, swaggering contempt and a deluge of jokes.” Israelis were mesmerized by their confidence that “war is not for Arabs,” as the “conception” was articulated by General Ezer Weizmann, who later became President.

The few who took Sadat seriously and tried to warn of the severity of the threat were also ignored, even the Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Israel Tal, who tried almost desperately to persuade the intelligence chiefs and the General Staff to attend to the facts before their eyes until a few days before the war, and was effectively cashiered from the army for his pains, on the initiative of the supremely confident hawk Moshe Dayan. Kapeliuk describes these events as “another symptom of the omnipotent power of the Defence Minister in everything done within the IDF, and the lack of public supervision over his actions.”

A peace agreement with Egypt, the only major Arab military force, would have been a very considerable step towards security for Israel. Its reasons for preferring expansion to peace and security were clearly articulated by leading military-political figures. General Chaim Bar-Lev of the governing Labor Party wrote in March 1972 that “I think that we could obtain a peace settlement on the basis of the earlier [pre-June 1967] borders. If I were persuaded that this is the maximum that we might obtain, I would say: agreed. But I think that it is not the maximum. I think that if we continue to hold out, we will obtain more.” A few weeks later General Weizmann explained that if Israel were to withdraw from the conquered territories, it could not “exist according to the scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies.” In the prevailing atmosphere that Kapeliuk reviews, one of arrogant dismissal of Arab military capacity and indeed racist contempt for Arabs generally, there seemed little reason to be unduly concerned about security problems.

The October war proved otherwise, shattering the myths. Furthermore, the war brought the superpowers dangerously close to nuclear confrontation. Kapeliuk writes that this was “one of the gravest international crises in Moscow-Washington relations, maybe the gravest one since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. For a moment it looked like a confrontation between the two superpowers … was near.”

To warn the Russians, Kissinger raised the nuclear alert to DEFCON 3, just below DEFCON 2 (the level at the peak of the Cuban missile crisis).

What was Kissinger warning the Russians about? Brezhnev was bitterly critical of the Israelis for continuing to violate the cease-fire and “continuing ‘to seize new and new territory from Egypt.’” According to the National Security Archive documentation of Kissinger’s role in this period, Nixon did not see the letter sent by Brezhnev until the following day. Timing was critical here. Brezhnev proposed the following: “Let us together urgently dispatch to Egypt the Soviet and American military contingents, to insure the implementation of the decision of the Security Council.” The Soviet leader warned of unilateral action: “if you find it impossible to
act jointly with us … we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the
question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” While Soviet insiders claimed that
no military moves in the Middle East were seriously planned, the movement of some
East German troops as well as signs of transport planes being sent to Egypt, evoked a
sharp response in Washington.

The U.S. response to Brezhnev’s letter which was sent out under Nixon’s name,
although he had not seen it, contained both a rejection of the proposal for joint U.S.-
Soviet military contingents in Egypt, and a denial that the “cease fire is now being
violated on any significant scale.”27 In addition, it asserted U.S. support for the ceasefire
and warned against the possible consequences of the USSR taking unilateral action.

Following the nuclear alert, Dobrynin called Kissinger, exclaiming, “I did not see
why the U.S. government was trying to create the impression of a dangerous crisis.”28
Kissinger responded by claiming that domestic factors had been major determinants of
U.S. action, and then assured Dobrynin that the DEFCON alert would be cancelled the
next day.29

It was not only Nixon who was initially kept in the dark about Kissinger’s moves;
so was NATO. To the great outrage of its members, NATO was not consulted about
the decision on DEFCON 3, which in itself clearly undermined the central purpose of
NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

Kissinger’s reply to French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet’s objection to the “lack
of U.S. consultation during the crisis either on the alert or the latest U.S. resolution
at the Security Council” was to disparage Washington’s European allies as “hostile
powers. Not once did we get their support.”30 The French position reflected that of
other NATO members, leading Donald Rumsfeld, who was then U.S. Ambassador to
NATO, to report sympathetically, that “most of the allies felt embarrassed by not being
even generally aware of what has been happening in the U.S.-Soviet discussions.”
Rumsfeld added that they were “further surprised and made to feel irrelevant by the
calling of the alert without prior notification until more than seven hours later.”31

This was the context for Kissinger’s famous “shuttle diplomacy,” an effort to
achieve some gains from the catastrophe for which he bore considerable responsibility.
But Kissinger’s involvement in the October War, which is little known, preceded this.

U.S. sources disclose that “Moscow was interested in a cease-fire throughout the
conflict,” given their scepticism about Arab military prospects and their concern about
the war’s effect on U.S.-Soviet relations.32

The Egyptian leader, however, “wanted to keep fighting in order to get political
concessions from Israel while Israel rejected a cease-fire that left Arab territorial
gains in place.”33 By the fourth day of the war, the Soviets let the U.S. know that they
wanted a UN Security Council resolution supporting a cease-fire, although they were
eager not to have their role be public. Kissinger delayed responding to the Soviets in
order to “give Tel Aviv time for military advances.”34 As a result of Israel’s advances,
the Egyptians turned against the cease-fire, relying on the Soviets for military aid.

As the war continued, Israelis became concerned about the Soviets resupplying
their Arab clients and turned to the U.S. for assistance. By Oct 12-13, Kissinger was
receiving reports from Israel about the need for ammunition and decided to respond positively in order to make certain that Israel would be “going as a fierce force.”

When it became clear that U.S. civilian carriers were unwilling to get involved, “Nixon ordered a major U.S. military airlift to supply Israel.” Two days later, with the Pentagon in charge, “seventeen flights a day were already scheduled with 25,000 tons of supplies approved for shipment.”

Kissinger’s goal was to assure Israeli military superiority, Egyptian submission short of total defeat, and Soviet subordination and marginalization in the Middle East.

From this perspective, Nixon’s effort to arrive at a Middle East settlement with the USSR was anathema to Kissinger who resented the President’s interference as well as his intention to work with Moscow. According to National Security Archive sources, “Nixon believed that Moscow and Washington had to impose a settlement: to ‘bring the necessary pressures on our respective friends.’” Such a policy would risk undermining Kissinger’s own preference for “buying time for Israeli military advances.”

Kissinger maneuvered to allow the Israelis to keep fighting, while ostensibly supporting the cease-fire. He let the Israelis know that he would not object if they delayed the implementation of the cease-fire in order to improve their position, as in the case of the crisis over the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Kissinger informed the Israeli Ambassador, Simha Dinitz, that “We would understand if Israelis felt they required some additional time for military dispositions.”

As to UN Resolution 338 (calling for a cease-fire and implementation of UN 242), “Kissinger gave the Israelis leeway in interpreting the cease-fire so they could gear-up military operations before it went into effect. He advised [Israeli PM Golda] Meir that if Israeli forces moved ‘during the night while I’m flying’ there would be no ‘violent protests from Washington’.”

The effect of the resulting Israeli violations of the cease-fire was not lost on the U.S. State Department, which revealed that Israel’s massive violations of the cease-fire were directed at encircling Egypt’s Third Army.

Kissinger was reported to be wary of Israelis dealing Egypt a decisive blow and finishing off the Third Army, yet he assured the Israeli Prime Minister of continued U.S. military aid, “more Phantom jets and a military aid request totalling $2.2 billion.”

Kissinger described U.S. objectives to Golda Meir as keeping the Arabs and the Soviets down; goals which he considered had been won by Israel and the U.S. It remained for the Arabs to face “objective reality” which obliged them “to talk to us,” since a settlement of the conflict was possible only through Washington.

As to the Arabs facing “objective reality,” Egyptian President Sadat had long recognized its meaning and had turned away from the USSR in an effort to win U.S. support in a resolution of the conflict with Israel, to no avail.

In the aftermath of a war that Kapeliuk argues shattered the myths that had dominated Israeli policy toward the Arab world, a vocal opposition emerged within Israel bent on challenging and changing the status quo, in particular the role of Moshe Dayan, then coming under harsh criticism. Kissinger was rumoured to have intervened to arrest its course, facilitating the continuity in power of Israel’s Labor Party hawks, chief among them the previously untouchable hero Dayan.
Dayan’s reluctant decision to accept demands for his resignation was reversed as a result of an alleged threat of a Syrian attack in the spring of 1974 that effectively bolstered his political immunity. These rumors of another war resulted in the mobilization of support for Dayan’s appointment as Minister of Defense in the postwar regime of Golda Meir. But matters were not so straightforward. As Kapeliuk reports, there were continuing doubts as to the validity of the alleged Syrian threat and its source:

All eyes were now on Dr Henry Kissinger. According to the rumors that were widespread in political circles, it had been he who had taken care to ‘plant’ the information, because he feared that a government from which Dayan and maybe even Golda was absent would not dare to sign a separation-of-forces agreement with Syria, on which great hopes depended.\footnote{45}

The implications of such actions for Israelis who questioned the dominant myths propagated by Dayan and Meir and their cohorts were grim. They were no better for those calling for a different conception of Israel’s future, one in line with the objective reality of Israel’s 1967 occupation of Palestinian territory.

In 1978-9, a peace treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt at Camp David under President Carter’s auspices, essentially accepting Sadat’s rejected 1971 offer, but in harsher terms from the U.S.-Israeli perspective. The 1971 proposal, like others of the period, paid no attention to Palestinian national rights. As in UN 242, Palestinians were mentioned only as refugees. But through the 1970s, Palestinian nationalism had entered the international agenda, and by 1978-9, Israel was compelled to agree to a treaty that offered eventual autonomy to the Palestinians – though Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin made it clear that Israel would ignore it, and proceeded to do so.

The Camp David treaty is regularly portrayed as a diplomatic triumph. More accurately, the whole series of events should be seen as a diplomatic catastrophe. The rejection of Sadat’s peace proposals in 1971 led to a devastating war and years of needless suffering, and finally to acceptance of the proposals that were offered in 1971 – though by then with at least formal recognition of Palestinian national rights. The U.S.-Israeli preference for expansion over security in 1971 may have been the most fateful decision in Israel’s history, particularly because it persisted beyond, in fact until the present, contributing to Israel’s unenviable status as “by far the most conflict-prone state in modern history.”\footnote{46}

Kapeliuk concludes that for all its trauma and tragedy, the October 1973 war might still “be considered a positive chapter, [but] only if it conforms to the true needs of Israel’s security, based on the lessons of this war.” The record of the forty years that followed, and the circumstances of today, provide little basis for such hopes. “The idol of the status quo,” which brought about near-terminal disaster forty years ago, is worshipped with renewed complacency today, and continues, as before, to
“prevent Israel from presenting serious proposals, plans and initiatives for peace with the neighbouring states” and by now, crucially, the Palestinians with whom it must somehow share this troubled land.

As in Avi Paz’s expose of the fraudulent peace claims that Israel allegedly offered Egypt and Syria after the 1967 war, so Amnon Kapeliuk dares to question Israeli policies justified in the name of peace, that have continued to subvert it.

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**Endnotes**

1 The following essay is offered as an introduction to Amnon Kapeliuk (Kapeliouk in French spelling), Israël: la fin des mythes (Paris: A. Michel, 197), a work that exposed the dominant myths of Israel’s foreign policy and urged a new look at Israel’s relations with the Arab world. The myths Kapeliuk discusses have not been destroyed, either in Israel or in the U.S., where Kapeliuk’s work, and the subjects he wrote about, remain largely unknown. Please note that references to Kapeliuk’s book that appear in the essay refer to the as yet unpublished English translation done by Mark Marshall from the Hebrew edition. Mr. Marshall informs Jerusalem Quarterly that Amnon Kapeliuk wrote his book twice, in Hebrew and again in French. The French edition is not a translation of the Hebrew.

2 This and all subsequent quotations are from Mark Marshall’s unpublished English translation of the Hebrew edition of Amnon Kapeliuk’s Israël: la fin des mythes.


11 March 7, 1949, enclosure, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Strategic Interest in Israel, in Records of the JCS, Part 2, 1948-1953, sec b, the Middle East, 181, Film A 368 B, Reel 2.


19 Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 413.

20 Henry Kissinger and Clare Booth Luce, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1279.


26 Ibid., 40.


28 October 25, 1973, Document 73, Nixon to Brezhnev, ibid., 42.

29 Ibid.

30 October 26, 1973, Document 75, State Department Cable 211737 to U.S. Embassy France, “Koskiusko-Morizet Call on Secretary,” ibid., 43. [the French Ambassador’s name appears under two different spellings here]


33 Ibid. Note that the same source indicates that the Syrians were reported to have favored a cease-fire in order to halt the Israeli advance.

34 Ibid.


36 Ibid., 21.

37 15 October, Document 31, Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State to Kissinger, “Armed Shipments to Israel,” ibid., 22.

38 October 20, 1973, Document 47, Situation Room Message from Peter Rodman to Kissinger, ibid., 30.


40 October 21, 1973, Document 51, U.S. Embassy Soviet Union Cable 13148 to Department of State, ibid., 32.


44 Ibid.

45 Kapeliuk, ch.7.

46 Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 5.