The End of the West? Conclusions

by

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1 Note that this draft has been written without knowledge of the final drafts of Anderson, Hall, Görtemaker, and Kupchan. The final version will integrate these chapters more fully.
1. Introduction

The purpose of this book is to explore the deep structure of the transatlantic relationship. What is underneath the recent conflicts between the U.S. and Europeans? Is it all about the Bush Administration, post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy, or the rupture about the Iraq war? If so, a return of U.S. foreign policy toward more centrist positions and of more Atlanticist governments in Germany and France might be all that is needed to get the Euro-Atlantic relationship back on track. Alternatively, are we witnessing the beginning of the end of a happy transatlantic relationship, the gradual whithering away of NATO, as some scholars had already predicted after the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1990; see also the chapter by Charles Kupchan)?

Most chapters in this volume suggest that neither is the case. Most authors appear to agree that, on the one hand, the transatlantic relationship is in a serious crisis that goes well beyond the usual “family disputes” among friends. Rather, we seem to witness one of those “extraordinary moment(s) when the existence and viability of the political order is called into question” (Ikenberry’s definition of a crisis in the introductory chapter). On the other hand, most authors equally agree that it is far too soon to spell the end of the transatlantic community. In this sense, Charles Kupchan’s diagnosis is not shared by most authors of this volume.

William Hitchcock, for example, argues in his contribution that the history of the transatlantic relationship has been a history of serious conflicts which have usually led to a re-definition of the transatlantic bargain. The current situation should be no exception. Henry Nau even suggests that the post-Cold War transatlantic relationship has evolved into a much deeper security community based on shared values such as democracy and market economy than the “threat community” that faced the Soviet Union. And Michael Byers claims that the U.S. and Europe still speak the same language when it comes to international law – contrary to what many legal scholars in Europe

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2 I thank the contributors of this volume and Ingo Peters for their insights into the transatlantic relationship. In particular, I am grateful to Helga Haftendorn and Henry Nau for comments on the draft outline of this chapter.
appear to suggest (cf. Nolte 2003; Tomuschat 2003; for a comprehensive discussion see Byers and Nolte 2003).

However, Jeffrey Anderson’s contribution highlights the fact that notions such as sovereignty which are constitutive for the current international system, are deeply controversial between the two sides of the Atlantic (CHECK). As the chapters by Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann as well as by John Hall point out, there are significant similarities, but also equally important differences with regard to the common values that are so often claimed to be at the core of the transatlantic relationship. Manfred Görtemaker adds the observation that German anti-Americanism is centuries-old and can always be activated or mobilized. And Kathleen McNamara and Jens van Scherpenberg both point out that the transatlantic economic interdependence provides no “super-glue” to keep the political relationship together in times of crisis.

This chapter does not attempt to comprehensively summarize the rich and complex findings of the individual chapters in this volume in order to provide definitive answers to the questions raised above. Rather, I want to highlight some of the arguments and controversies in this volume and to draw my own conclusions. I start with some remarks on the nature of the transatlantic political order. Interestingly enough, most authors in this volume who do not share a commitment to the same theoretical outlook to international relations, nevertheless agree that the transatlantic relationship constitutes far more than a traditional alliance.

Second, I comment on the degree to which the contributors to this volume see the transatlantic relationship in crisis. Most authors join the view that the alliance is in crisis as defined by John Ikenberry’s introduction, but they disagree profoundly as to its scope and severity. The third part of this chapter addresses what we can learn about the sources and causes of the current crisis. Fourth, I discuss the various scenarios of breakdown, adaptation, and transformation (see the introduction) in light of the individual chapters.
2. The Nature of the Atlantic Order

As mentioned above, the authors of this volume agree that the transatlantic order constitutes more than just a traditional security alliance. As John Ikenberry points out in the introduction, the Atlantic order is also more than NATO. It rests on a specific configuration of interests, institutions, and identities which resembles what Karl W. Deutsch has called a “pluralistic security community” in the late 1950s (Deutsch and et al. 1957; see also Adler and Barnett 1998b; Risse-Kappen 1995). As a result, the transatlantic security community ensures “dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Deutsch and et al. 1957, 9) so that war among the transatlantic partners has become unthinkable. Moreover, the Atlantic order constitutes a particular cooperative order among the allies that has so far guaranteed the peaceful resolution of intra-alliance conflicts.

This agreement among the authors is remarkable insofar as it departs from neorealist international relations theory that would consider the Atlantic order as just another security alliance (see e.g. Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993; and most contributions in Ikenberry 2002, for such treatments). While most authors in this volume probably do not share the moderately constructivist underpinnings of the “security community” argument (as exemplified in Adler and Barnett 1998a), they nevertheless concur that the Western order constitutes a social structure based on collectively shared values and norms which both constitute and regulate the behavior of the partners. It is then a matter of degree to what extent material power shapes or is itself shaped by the social structure of the Western world.

Charles Kupchan’s treatment of the transatlantic alliance in this volume (see also Kupchan 2003) probably comes closest to Realpolitik thinking. Kupchan sees a long-term trend of a changing material power balance away from U.S. preponderance and, simultaneously, the rise of European and Asian power. In his view, the “unipolar moment” (Mastanduno 1997) is just that, a moment of history. For Kupchan, the question is not whether the future international order will become multipolar or not, but whether the transition to multipolarity can be managed “by design” rather than
coming about “by default” (Kupchan 2003, 263). Yet, even Kupchan does not share the neorealist view that we will witness the return of the security dilemma in the transatlantic relationship (CHECK).

Henry Nau, in his contribution, offers an interesting mixture of realist and moderately constructivist thinking. He argues that the origins of NATO and of the Western alliance can be best explained by the perception of a common (Soviet) threat and, thus, shares a modified realist “balance of threat” view (see also Nau 2002; Walt 1987). Over time, however, a common democratic identity was built up during the Cold War that kept NATO intact after the end of the Cold War. In other words, the transatlantic order has left its realist underpinnings behind and has evolved over time into a liberal security community of democratic states.

Conceptualizing the Western order in terms of a security community, however, has substantial consequences for the way in which we analyze the current crisis and predict possible outcomes. First, material power and shifts in the Euro-Atlantic power balance matter, of course (see chapters by Kupchan, but also by McNamara and van Scherpenberg). But the more we theorize the transatlantic relationship as a security community, the less changes in the material power balance matter as such and the more they are mitigated by institutional and ideational factors. (Social constructivists would add, of course, that the meaning of “material power” depends on their discursive construction.) As a result, one must analyze changes in the institutional fabric of the transatlantic order and in the realm of ideational meaning construction (identities, values, norms, etc.) separately and determine their contribution to current crisis of the relationship as well as possible outcomes.

Second, however, conceptualizing the Western relationship as a security community does not preclude the possibility that it will break apart or whither away. Earlier work, including my own (see e.g. Risse 2002), assumed to some extent that security communities are somehow safe and unlikely to break apart. In any event, they would be more stable than mere security alliances held
together by a common threat perception (for a critical discussion of moderate social constructivist assumptions of stability in social orders see Gunther Hellmann’s chapter).

There is no theoretical reason, though, why security communities should survive longer than traditional alliances. If the underlying sources of a security community start shifting, a security community will undergo crisis as well. The main point is here that conceptualizing the Western order as a security community rather than a traditional alliance directs our attention toward different causes for the survival or demise of such orders (see graph 1). A decline in the degree of interdependence, in the institutional underpinnings, or in collective identities can trigger a crisis of a security community as much as a decline in the common threat will lead to the breakdown of traditional alliances. In other words, if we witness a crisis of a security community, we have to look at different causes from the ones which would result in the breakdown of a traditional alliance.

Graph 1: Security Communities vs. Traditional Alliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying Causes</th>
<th>Security Community</th>
<th>Traditional Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interests/Common threat</td>
<td>Significance depends on degree of collective identity/ shared values</td>
<td>Most important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Less important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Significance depends on degree of threat perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One could argue, though, that security communities are ultimately more stable than traditional alliances, because they rest on more than one underlying sources. As a result, a change in one of the ingredients might not trigger an all-out crisis, as is the case concerning a declining threat with regard to a traditional alliance.
This conceptual clarification is supported by the evidence presented in the various chapters of this volume. While most authors agree on the nature of the transatlantic order, there are profound differences as regards the evaluation of the current crisis as well as its causes and the prospects for the future.

3. Crisis, What Crisis?

The authors in this volume have adopted a common definition of what constitutes a crisis: A crisis represents “an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order is called into question” (introductory chapter by John Ikenberry). At such a critical juncture, the four Is that constitute a security community – interests, interdependence, institutions, identity (see above) – are put into jeopardy. This volume assumes that the transatlantic community is in crisis when at least one of the four Is is in serious trouble. Note at this point that using the four Is as crisis indicators precludes the possibility that they can serve as underlying causes for the transatlantic disputes. Otherwise, the argument risks becoming tautological. Thus, if we argue that NATO is in crisis because of a breakdown of its institutional rules (see e.g. Haftendorn 2002, 2005) and, at the same time, define crisis in terms of a breakdown of such rules, we are in methodological trouble. In the following, therefore, I use the four Is as crisis indicators rather than its causes.

Most authors in this volume agree that at least one of the conditions for a transatlantic crisis is fulfilled. Yet, there are some disagreements on how far and how deep the crisis has developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identities, values</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Irrelevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Interests*
Once again, we need to be careful methodologically. In a certain sense, conflicts of interests are an enduring feature of security communities as well as alliances. In fact, cooperative arrangements are meant to deal with conflicts of interests almost by definition. In harmony, there is no need for active cooperation (see Keohane 1989, on this point). Thus, conflicts of interest as such between the U.S. and its European partners are a common feature of the transatlantic partnership and their peaceful resolution is daily routine in a security community. When conflicts of interest develop into a crisis, something more must be happening. I suggest that conflicts of interest have escalated into a crisis, when either of two conditions are met:

1. The various – and “normal” – policy disputes cover such a broad range of issues that the existing institutions are increasingly unable to handle them.

2. The policy conflicts increasingly touch upon what either side believes to be a core interest.

(Note that there is no “objective” measurement of what constitute “core interests;” it is in the eye of the beholder when core interests are touched.)

Concerning the first point, few would probably dispute that the sheer range of transatlantic policy disputes is almost without precedent in the history of the alliance. While the history of the transatlantic order is a history of enduring conflicts and crises, as William Hitchcock points out in his chapter, we have rarely seen times when the transatlantic policy disputes covered such a wide spectrum of issues (see Krell 2003). For years - pre-dating the Bush Administration -, Europeans and Americans have disagreed over questions such as climate change and other environmental issues. Human rights issues such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the death penalty, and – most recently – even what constitutes torture and how to treat transnational terrorists, have also become questions of transatlantic tension. The U.S. and its European allies do not see eye to eye on most arms control agreements, from the treaty to ban landmines to the comprehensive test ban

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4 I owe this point to Ingo Peters. See also Peters forthcoming.
treaty and – again most recently – with regard to the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. There is no transatlantic agreement on how to reform the United Nations in general and the UN Security Council in particular. Differences over the UN Millenium goals have been papered over rather than solved. The same holds true for the question of “preemptive self-defense” (see Michael Byers’ chapter on this question). Europeans continuously complain about what they see as increasing U.S. unilateralism in international affairs. And, as Jens van Scherpenberg points out in his chapter, a whole range of transatlantic economic disputes looms in the background. The most serious of these conflicts concern economic as well as security issues, such as the ongoing dispute over subsidies for Boeing and Airbus, respectively. Given this range of conflicts, it is very hard not to conclude that the transatlantic partnership faces a serious crisis.

Moreover, some authors in this volume go further and argue that the transatlantic conflicts have reached the level of core security interests. Henry Nau suggests, for example, that the current crisis is rooted in serious and sharp differences in the perception of threats after September 11, 2001. He argues that 9/11 has dramatically changed America’s worldview as a result of which transnational terrorism has been defined as a “clear and present danger” to the country’s national security that has to be countered by – among others – military means. In contrast, most Europeans perceive terrorism as one threat among many others and as mostly an internal rather than an external/military security issue. Consequently, terrorists are seen as ordinary criminals rather than (“illegal”) combatants in a “war on terrorism” (see also Katzenstein 2003 on the different social constructions of the terrorist threat). Nau sees this difference in threat perception as the root cause of the transatlantic row over the Iraq war. And it could lead to a breakup of the community, if, for example, the imperial perception of the threat were to prevail in the U.S., while the multipolar (French) vision would gain the upperhand in Europe.

Thus, the question is not so much whether the conflicts of interest have reached a level of transatlantic crisis in which the current order is in jeopardy, but what will be the crisis outcome.
Can the various conflicts of interests be solved within the existing transatlantic institutional framework, or could they lead to the breakdown of these institutions? And what if there is a “spill-over” from differences in threat perceptions to disagreement over values, as some have argued (e.g. Kagan 2003)?

(Economic) Interdependence

If there is one area in which most observers still paint a happy picture of the transatlantic community, it concerns the economic relationship (see particularly Hamilton and Quinlan 2005). Moreover, this picture lets some authors conclude that, therefore, economic interdependence can help overcome a period of policy crisis in the transatlantic relationship. As Kathleen McNamara points out in her chapter, this is pretty much a modern version of Norman Angell’s functionalist argument of the early 20th century (Angell 1913).

Yet, the two chapters in this volume examining the transatlantic economic relationship depart from the conventional wisdom. To be sure, nobody sees the economic partnership in a similar crisis as the political or security relationship. But this is not the issue at stake. Rather, two questions have to be asked when it comes to transatlantic economic relations:

1. How deeply integrated is the transatlantic economy, both in historical comparison and compared to other inter-regional relations?

2. Can economic interdependence provide the “super glue” that keeps a political relationship together?

As to the first question, both McNamara and van Scherpenberg agree that there is indeed continuing economic interdependence across the Atlantic.5 Yet, U.S. dependence on transatlantic trade was much higher prior to World War I than in this “age of globalization” (see McNamara’s

5 In the classic formulation by Keohane and Nye, interdependent relationships are „costly to break“ for either side and characterized by mutually high sensitivity and vulnerability (cf. Keohane and Nye 1977).
chapter). And transatlantic trade has recently evolved much weaker than U.S. and EU trade with China and East Asia (van Scherpenberg’s chapter). In contrast, mutual foreign direct investment (FDI) has reached unprecedented high levels and the same holds true for capital flows. But FDI constitutes an ambiguous indicator for interdependence. On the one hand, deep commercial engagement of U.S. firms in Europe and of European firms in the U.S. increases the mutual stakes into each other’s well-being. On the other hand, the motives for FDI – gaining market access and insuring against currency changes – indicate a lack of economic integration rather than proving it (see van Scherpenberg’s chapter). In a single and deeply integrated market such as the EU, foreign direct investment is less necessary. In sum, there is still transatlantic economic interdependence, but nothing to fret about too glowingly.

As to the second question, McNamara and van Scherpenberg are rather sceptical toward the “super glue” vision, albeit for different reasons. Van Scherpenberg points to a whole range of transatlantic economic conflicts that can easily overwhelm the transatlantic political agenda, too. While they can still be managed bilaterally and by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system, the economic relationship cannot be used to keep the security partnership from collapsing. Moreover, conflicts over security interests have recently spilled over into the economic area. Thus, van Scherpenberg’s view is pretty much in line with a realist perspective.

McNamara comes to a similar conclusion, but from an institutionalist perspective. The old battle between interdependence theorists and (neo-) realists is still on over whether economic interdependence leads to peace or is irrelevant for security (see e.g. Mansfield and Pollins 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001; Barbieri 2002; Waltz 1979). Yet, it seems clear that we can draw few conclusions from this debate for our “super glue” question. First, “interdependence” and “level of conflict” are such macro-variables that the statistical results seem to be highly dependent on the precise indica-
tors and operationalizations chosen (see also McNamara’s chapter for a discussion). Second, the “super glue” question is not really about war and peace, but about whether a tight economic relationship can prevent a political crisis from getting out of control. However, not even Charles Kupchan expects the U.S. and Europe to go to war against each in the foreseeable future (see his chapter in this volume).

In sum, the answer to the second question is negative, irrespective of whether one shares a realist or an institutionalist outlook on international affairs. While the economic relationship is basically intact, we cannot expect it to overcome and to fix political conflicts. Yet, Kathleen McNamara also offers a somewhat more hopeful outlook. She argues from a more sociologically inspired institutionalist perspective that it is not the economic relationship as such that might prevent the security community from breaking apart. Rather, it is the high level of institutionalized exchanges among networks of regulators and economic lawyers that keep the transatlantic economic relationship on track and that might shape the impact of economic on political relations. Thus, the causal mechanism concerns the social embeddedness of markets in institutionalized relations leading to socialization effects on actors that keep the relationship on a cooperative track. But are the institutions of the transatlantic relationships not in crisis, too?

Institutions

The authors in this volume profoundly disagree whether the institutional framework of the transatlantic security community is in crisis or not. However, the different assessments have a lot to do with the issue-areas concerned, on the one hand, and the type of institutions, on the other.

While Kathleen McNamara (see above) argues that the transatlantic economic relationship has survived economic conflicts so far because of its embeddedness in highly institutionalized bilat-

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6 This is in contrast to the „democratic peace“ thesis which has been proven empirically so robust that different indicators do not lead to different outcomes. See the review in Levy 2002.
eral relationships of transgovernmental networks, Jens van Scherpenberg sees a serious and potentially dangerous lack of transatlantic institutions to deal with bilateral trade disputes that are not subject to WTO rules. Both might actually have a point, since they seem to focus on different types of institutions. Van Scherpenberg is certainly right that we lack transatlantic formal institutions in the economic area that match the density of NATO and the security institutions. In contrast, McNamara’s transgovernmental networks of like-minded regulators, bureaucrats, and lawyers constitute largely informal institutions (see also Slaughter 2004 on the significance of such networks).

As to the core of the security community, most observers seem to agree that NATO is in a serious crisis that touches the core of the institution and has led to the “near death of the transatlantic alliance” (Pond 2004). After 9/11, the NATO Council invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the alliance – and nothing happened. It was not NATO that intervened in Afghanistan to uproot the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network, but the U.S. and a coalition of the European willing (and others). When the Iraq crisis erupted, the NATO Council never did what it was supposed to do, namely to manage the transatlantic security partnership. It never discussed the conflict over Iraq, largely for fear that such an open dispute might lead to the collapse of NATO. Instead, the dispute erupted in the UN Security Council. Suicide of NATO for fear of death? Moreover, if mutual consultation and joint decision-making are constitutive norms governing the North Atlantic alliance (see Risse-Kappen 1995 for details), these norms were all severely violated during the past years – by both Americans and Europeans. Neither Jacques Chirac nor Gerhard Schröder bothered to consult with NATO before they declared their opposition to U.S. intentions to invade Iraq. Of course, the Bush Administration also kept NATO out of its own decision-making process, too (see Woodward 2004 for details). Last not least, the U.S. administration’s preference for “coalitions of the willing” is at odds with the decision-making rules of a multilateral alliance that require consultation and serious efforts at joint decisions.
However, as Henry Nau points out in this volume, Iraq might have shattered NATO at the political level, but the military cooperation functioned flawlessly during the Iraq war (see also Haftendorn 2005). And while the political NATO almost collapsed over the Iraq war, military NATO took over its first “out of area” operation by assuming command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan at the same time in April 2003. NATO’s role in the Balkans where it is still in charge of peacekeeping in Kosovo (KFOR), has been largely successful. Most observers agree that NATO enlargement has been a tremendous achievement and has been crucial to re-socialize the Eastern European military into the armed forces of democratic societies (see Gheciu 2005). And the alliance’s military transformation from a Cold War military posture to the new reality of out-of-area interventions and peace-keeping as well as –enforcement missions has won almost universal praise.

Thus, the crisis seems to be confined to NATO’s political structure in the sense that the North Atlantic Council has largely neglected its role as the prime manager of the transatlantic security relationship. At the same time, NATO as a military organization appears to be alive and kicking.

Finally, what about the underlying understandings and collective normative commitments that are constitutive of a security community? Conventional wisdom holds that there are deep and fundamental disagreements between Europeans and Americans concerning such foundational concepts as interpretations of international law or understandings of sovereignty. As to notions of sovereignty, Jeffrey Anderson argues in this volume that, indeed, the U.S. and Europe differ profoundly in their conceptions of sovereignty. Particularly continental Europeans have adopted a notion of sovereignty that can be divided, shared, pooled, or simply given up – and have done so in their practices in the process of European integration. As a result, they live in a post-Westphalian world and are increasingly inclined to promote legalization and even supranational solutions on a

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7 They did not bother to consult with the EU, either, for that matter.
global scale. The unresolved dispute between the U.S. and Europe with regard to the ICC exemplifies this point.

However, while the U.S. might remain the last Western power to cling to traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty, these differences between Europeans and U.S. Americans do not extend into the foundational rules of international law, as Michael Byers forcefully argues in this volume. Contrary to what many Europeans, including international lawyers, appear to assume, even the Bush Administration does not see itself above international law, but has made sustained efforts to justify its actions in accordance with international law. Byers points out that the U.S. and Europe have enormous stakes in international law since it was the transatlantic community which is largely responsible for its current form and content. He argues that the foundational rules of how to interpret international law and the right of self-defense remain intact and that there is more agreement between U.S. and Europe than disagreement. Some of the differences in the interpretation of international law – e.g. to what extent Art. 51 of the UN Charter includes the right to preemptive or even preventive self-defense – result from differences in the interpretative rules applied. Many continental European lawyers and legal scholars share a textual (positivist) interpretation of international law, while their American counterparts are more inclined to promote a purposive interpretation. But these meta-rules of interpretation remain within the realm of legitimate readings of international law and they do not constitute unresolvable differences in the approaches (see also Byers and Nolte 2003; but see Nolte 2003 for a much gloomier perspective).

In sum, a mixed and rather complex picture emerges when we use the state of the institutional settings of the transatlantic community as an indicator for a transatlantic crisis. In the economic realm, a rather thin layer of formal bilateral institutions for economic governance coexists with “thick” transgovernmental networks of experts, bureaucrats, and regulators. NATO continues to thrive as a military institution, while it has largely failed to manage the transatlantic political relationship. And the U.S. and Europe disagree over notions of sovereignty and interpret international
law differently, but they still share the same fundamentally positive outlook toward international law in general. Thus, the institutional framework of the transatlantic community is neither fully intact nor in shatters. Equally complex findings pertain to the collective identity and the underlying values of the transatlantic community.

**Identities**

What about the sense of community, the collective identity and the underlying values of the transatlantic community? Are Americans increasingly from Mars, while Europeans seem to populate Venus, as Robert Kagan has put it (Kagan 2003)? Unfortunately, reality is a bit more complex than the popular literature on the subject assumes. Moreover, studying collective identities and reaching firm conclusions constitutes a methodologically rather difficult endeavour, since there is little agreement in the literature about what can be used as valid indicators for a “sense of community” (for a discussion see Herrmann, Brewer, and Risse 2004). Last not least, it is rather unclear how much collective identity is necessary for a transnational community to work. Studies of the EU have shown, for example, that identification with Europe and the EU as a “secondary identity” (nation first, Europe second) is sufficient to ensure strong support for European integration (see e.g. Citrin and Sides 2004; Marks and Hooghe 2003). We simply lack comparatively sophisticated data on the transatlantic community to be able to reach firm conclusions. With this caveat in mind, our contributors nevertheless point to some valid findings from a variety of methodologies.

On the one hand, Henry Nau argues strongly that the transatlantic value community remains intact and has grown even stronger in the post-Cold War era than before. While the Cold War community was primarily held together by a common perception of the (Soviet) threat, the post-Cold War community rests on collective values such as democracy, human rights, and market economy. In that sense, Nau suggests, the transatlantic relationship has only recently transformed itself
from a security alliance to a security community. However, Nau’s arguments seem to pertain primarily to the level of political elites on either side of the Atlantic.

On the other hand, the chapters by Dieter Fuchs/Hans-Dieter Klingemann, John Hall, and Manfred Görtemaker all point to potential cracks in the common value base. To be sure, as Fuchs and Klingemann show in their contribution, American and European citizens belong to the same “Western civilization” when it comes to supporting democracy, human rights, and market economy in general (for the concept of a “Western civilization” see the controversial volume by Huntington 1996). However, major differences between Europeans – particularly Germans and French – and Americans pertain to the way in which democracy is institutionalized. U.S. citizens support libertarian ideas such as a reduced state role in the economy, self-responsibility, and civic engagements. In contrast, a majority of Europeans prefers a strong welfare state providing social equality and solidarity. However, one should also note that Europeans are more heterogeneous themselves when it comes to fundamental values. Religiosity and national identification are cases in point. Regarding the latter two values, Poland is much closer to the U.S. than it is to its immediate neighbor Germany or to France. Popular notions that Americans are religious, while Europeans are secular, should, therefore, be taken with a grain of salt (see, however, Braml 2004 on the political significance of the religious right in the U.S.).

While Fuchs and Klingemann use macro-quantitative survey data to analyze value orientations, Hall’s and Görtemaker’s contributions essentially argue from a perspective grounded in historical sociology. Hall points out that – in the longue durée – value differences between US and Europe have gained in significance, while similarities have been played down. As a result, mutual resentment seems to be growing, but has not yet reached a breaking point. Hall argues that the U.S. was much more Europeanized in the 19th century due to the flow of immigrants than today. And Görtemaker describes the long history of cultural anti-Americanism in Germany going back to the 18th century. Thus, anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon, but has historical roots dating...
back to the time when the U.S. was founded. The history of anti-Americanism provides contemporary “anti-Bushism” with stereotypes that can be easily exploited by political elites. In other words, while European criticism of U.S. foreign policy certainly does not constitute anti-Americanism per se, it can be fuelled by and, therefore, easily escalate into the latter. In the case of Germany, for example, the recent crisis over Iraq has triggered a wave of anti-Americanism on the political left and the right who have joined forces for the first time.

This last point has larger implications for the transatlantic community as a whole. The data and findings presented in this volume and pertaining to the sense of community do not allow to conclude that there is an urgent and immediate crisis in the value base of the transatlantic relationship. The survey data presented by Fuchs and Klingemann as well as the historical and sociological analyses by Görtemaker and Hall point to long-term developments and underlying currents rather than short-term crisis events. In other words, we cannot use these findings as indicators for an immediate crisis of the transatlantic relationship. Rather, these arguments suggest that the collective value basis of the transatlantic community might be shakier than Sunday speeches celebrating Western values pretend.

*Summary: A Lingering Crisis*

This survey of the state of the transatlantic community using interests, interdependence, institutions, and identities – the four Is – as indicators, yields mixed results (see graph 2). When it comes to political interests and to threat perceptions, the contributions in this volume overwhelmingly agree that the transatlantic relationship is in crisis. Regarding economic interdependence, there is no crisis, but the economic ties are weaker than conventional wisdom assumes and, more important, is unlikely to save the political relationship when the latter is not in good shape. A mixed picture emerges with regard to the institutional framework of the transatlantic community. While NATO as a *political* institution is in crisis, other parts of the institutional settings remain largely intact including
NATO’s military integration and, interestingly enough, including the mutual commitment to international law. Last not least, while there is no immediate breakdown in the sense of community, the collective identities and values beneath the transatlantic community are shakier than is often assumed.

**Graph 2: Transatlantic Crisis Scorecard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>State of the Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interests/Common threat</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Neither crisis nor “super glue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Mixed results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identities, values</td>
<td>No immediate crisis, but enduring differences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, the crisis scorecard does not sustain an alarmist picture according to which the transatlantic community is beyond repair. Charles Kupchan’s diagnosis remains the exception in this volume and is not shared by other authors. But, at the same time, none of the contribution to this volume allows the opposite conclusion, either, namely that there is nothing to worry about. The emerging overall picture is one of a crisis underneath the surface that is somehow lingering on. There seems to be a latent crisis of the transatlantic community which might escalate into a full-blown and manifest crisis by any further trigger event which could shake up the Atlantic order beyond repair.

**4. Underlying Sources of the Transatlantic Crisis**
But what are the underlying sources or causes of the transatlantic crisis? As already mentioned above, we need to be careful here not to confuse crisis indicators with its underlying sources. If, e.g., differences in threat perceptions serve as indicators, they cannot have caused the transatlantic crisis. Or take 9/11 and the ensuing differences in the intensity of threat perceptions (chapter by Henry Nau): one and the same event – the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – cannot have caused differences in threat perceptions which are then taken as indicators of crisis. Rather, some underlying and pre-existing divergent interpretive frames could have caused the differences in threat perceptions that were then triggered by 9/11. As Katzenstein and others have argued, European overwhelmingly view transnational terrorism as threats to their internal security which then triggers measures of crime prevention and criminal justice (Katzenstein 2003; see also Katzenstein 2002). The attacks in Madrid and London have not changed this framing of the events at all. In contrast, Americans tend to view transnational terrorism as a threat to international security which then triggers military responses. George W. Bush’s framing of the response to the 9/11 attacks – “war on terrorism” – might have triggered this perception. But it is more likely that Bush’s framing somehow resonated with the average American’s worldview. In sum, if the current crisis is one of diverging threat perceptions resulting from 9/11, the underlying cause would be differences in the way in which threats are perceived (and framed – “securitized” in the language of the Copenhagen school, see Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998).

As Gunther Hellmann argues in his chapter using Pierson’s typology, most analysts of the transatlantic relationship use causal arguments that highlight long-term structural changes with slowly developing consequences. Scholars mostly emphasize gradual transformations, not rapid and deep change. In Hellmann’s terms, “global warming” would be the appropriate analogy (long-term cause, long-term consequence). If we use the Hellmann’s typology to assess the contributions in this volume and, at the same time, are careful not to confuse crisis indicators with its causes, we can make the following points. The underlying causes identified by the chapters in this volume can be
grouped as ideational or material “global warming”, on the one hand, or as ideational or material “meteorite” (sudden cause, long-term consequence), on the other hand.

*Ideational “Global Warming”: Increasing Value Gaps?*

The chapters by Görtemaker, Hall, and Fuchs/Klingemann all point out that there are enduring und underlying value cleavages between continental Europe and the U.S. While some of these cleavages are quite old (such as cultural anti-Americanism, see Görtemaker’s chapter), they might have gained in significance in recent years. It remains unclear, however, what the causal link is between underlying and continuing value differences and the current crisis. We do not know for sure, for example, if the value gap is growing. On the one hand, some data seem to suggest indeed that Americans are becoming more religious (Kohut and al. 2000), while Europeans – on average – are becoming more secular (Gerhards and Hölscher 2005; see also chapter by Fuchs and Klingemann).

On the other hand, data also show that Europe is becoming more religious resulting from Eastern European accession to the EU (even though Jürgen Gerhards suggests in his path-breaking study that Europeanization equals secularization and that, therefore, the significance of religion for political attitudes might be on its way out even in Catholic Poland; see again Gerhards and Hölscher 2005). As to the U.S., it is not clear whether Americans are becoming more religious on average rather than more polarized concerning religion. Recent election data suggest that there is one part of America that holds secular and “European” values, so to speak, lives on either Coast (plus Chicago) – and votes overwhelmingly Democratic. The other part of America seems to be more conservative and more religious at the same time – and votes Republican (see overview in Braml 2004). Data suggest that traditional religiosity (whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish) has become the second-best demographic predictor of voting behavior, next to race in the U.S.

If this is true, then the issue is not so much a growing value gap between Europe and America, but an increasing difference in the extent to which religion is politicized on either side of the Atlantic. And this politicization of religion would also be the causal mechanism linking the existing
value gap to the transatlantic crisis in the following sense: To the extent that traditional religious values are also correlated strongly with foreign policy attitudes that favor unilateralism and the use of military force (CHECK DATA), AND that the religious right forms an important backbone of the Republican party’s constituency, this would translate in a growing gap in the foreign policy outlook between the U.S. and Europe. Of course, this thought also implies that a change in U.S. government (or in Congress, or both) might de-emphasize the transatlantic tensions once again.

A similar argument can be made with regard to anti-Americanism in Europe. As Görtemaker argues, cultural anti-Americanism is an almost constant feature in Germany for decades, if not centuries. Thus, it cannot serve as a cause for the current transatlantic crisis. However, policy-makers – and Gerhard Schröder serves as the most recent example – can readily tap into anti-Americanism and make it politically relevant. Once again, politicization appears to be key here, not the underlying values as such. They only become salient, if political elites start using them for political purposes. The causal chain would, thus, look as follows:

Value gap/anti-Americanism $\rightarrow$ politicization $\rightarrow$ transatlantic crisis

Material “Global Warming”: The End of the Cold War and Unipolarity

Some argue, Charles Kupchan in this volume in particular (CHECK), that the rise of transatlantic tensions is one of the long-term consequences of the end of the Cold War and of the emergence of a unipolar international system dominated by the United States (see also Ikenberry 2002 for a debate). This claim originates from realist thinking in international relations theory, of course. With the Soviet threat gone, the alliance glue weakens and NATO is doomed, as John Mearsheimer predicted already in 1990 (Mearsheimer 1990; see also Waltz 1993). At the same time, American hegemony in a unipolar system manifests itself in military superiority and gives rise to growing resentment across the globe. Eventually, as most realists argue (except for Wohlfforth 1999), counter-balancing
behavior will emerge. While most analysts using realist thought point to Asia and the People’s Republic of China as the most likely balancer of U.S. power in the future, Kupchan sees Europe on the rise bringing about “the end of the American era” (Kupchan 2003).

It should be noted here that Kupchan’s arguments sharply contradict those made by Robert Kagan who also uses realist theory to make his points (Kagan 2003). For Kupchan, the current transatlantic crises are fundamentally caused by looming American decline and the continuing rise of European power. Thus, they result from a shift in the balance of power in the global system that the end of the Cold War has brought about. Kagan, however, sees the crisis emanating from U.S. strength and European weakness. While both agree that the transatlantic partnership might be doomed, they completely disagree on the underlying causes.

Material “Meteorite”: 9/11 and Its Consequences

CHECK KUPCHAN HERE!

While most chapters in this volume can be captured by Hellmann’s “global warming” metaphor when dealing with the underlying causes for the transatlantic tensions, at least one causal argument in favor of “meteoritic” change (sudden cause, long-term consequence) can be extracted from the chapters. Henry Nau argues, for example, that the terrorist attacks against the U.S. on 9/11 have led to differences in threat perceptions that constitute the current crisis. As mentioned above, however, it is probably more appropriate to think of 9/11 as a trigger event that serves as a catalyst for diverging threat perceptions rather than a “meteoritic” cause of crisis in the strict sense.

Nevertheless, one could argue that the long-term consequences of 9/11 may eventually lead to the end of the transatlantic relationship for the following reasons. If, for example, we continue to see the rise (or return) of a U.S. “national security state” and of U.S. unilateralism in response to the terrorist threats and if Europe follows through on its path of responding to terrorism by focussing
primarily on crime prevention, the policy responses to 9/11 would continue to diverge. This could, in turn, drive the transatlantic alliance further apart. However, this scenario depends a lot on which perception of the terrorist threat prevails on either side of the Atlantic in the future (see Nau’s chapter on this point).

*Ideational “Meteorite”: The Rise of the Neo-Conservative Movement*

It is interesting to note that none of the authors in this volume talks a lot about the so-called Neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration as “ideational meteorites” who might have provoked the transatlantic crisis. The “Wilsonians with boots” (Hassner 2002; see also Mead 2001) are treated in the literature as being primarily responsible for the post-9/11 U.S. unilateralism. This group did indeed overtake George W. Bush’s foreign policy after the terrorist attacks and was also responsible for the invasion of Iraq (see e.g. Woodward 2002, 2004). Moreover, its foreign policy outlook differs considerably from the views on international politics dominating among the European political elites from the center-left to the center-right (see e.g. Risse 2003a).

However, if the authors in this volume are correct, the rise of the neo-conservative movement might have triggered the crisis over Iraq. But it is far from clear whether this group can be made responsible of the larger transatlantic crisis identified in this volume. First, many transatlantic policy divergences pre-date 9/11 and the Bush Administration. Second, if the analysis in this book is correct, the decline of neo-conservative influence in Washington is not likely to put the transatlantic crisis to rest. There simply seem to be too many “global warming” factors looming in the background.

In sum, if we look at the causes rather than the indicators for the crisis of the transatlantic order, there seem to be underlying ideational as well as material factors that continue to create trouble in the relationship. Among them are significant value gaps, anti-Americanism, but also material
changes in the international system such as the end of the Cold War. Yet, these underlying factors are not much more than latent causes for transatlantic trouble. To manifest themselves in a crisis, they must be triggered by some event or by the deliberate action of some policy-makers. Neither value gaps nor anti-Americanism cause transatlantic crises as such. Rather, they can be tapped into by policy-makers on either side of the Atlantic. While the American neo-conservatives politicized the value gaps with regard to religion, European policy-makers mobilized anti-Americanism in order to legitimize their opposition to the Iraq war.

The same holds true for underlying material causes for a transatlantic crisis, such as the end of the Cold War, the rise of unipolarity, or 9/11 as a catastrophic event. It is hard to argue that any of these underlying causes inevitably leads to the end of the alliance (but see Kupchan’s chapter in this volume). Rather, they become politically salient, if they lead to divergences in threat perceptions that then lead to diverging policy responses resulting in a transatlantic crisis.

But what about the future of the transatlantic order? Will we be witnessing the gradual breakdown of the transatlantic community, its revival through a new “transatlantic bargain,” or something in between?

5. Crisis Outcomes: Breakdown, Adaptation, or Transformation?

As John Ikenberry points out in the introduction, the transatlantic crisis can have three possible outcomes: 1) It can lead to breakdown and the end of the Atlantic order. 2) The Atlantic order might be transformed and fundamentally re-structured regarding the norms and institutions of the relationship. 3) The crisis can lead to adaptation, that is, changes in some rules, while leaving most of the institutions intact.

There might be a fourth possibility, though, namely that the transatlantic crisis simply lingers on, above and below the surface. Henry Nau’s “conservative internationalist” scenario resem-
bles this outcome. Europe and the U.S. might continue to disagree on the nature of the threat and institutional ties weaken over time, but some common values persist. Such a scenario is not unlikely given the lack of strong political leadership on either side of the Atlantic. Leadership, however, has been crucial historically to help the alliance out of a crisis, as William Hitchcock makes very clear in his analysis. Unfortunately, if the diagnosis in this volume is correct – crisis pertaining to core interests, many ambiguities with regard to institutions and common values -, then “lingering on” without at least some degree of pro-active adaptation might not suffice. As a result, this scenario might ultimately lead to a gradual breakdown of the transatlantic order.

The “Breakdown” Scenario: Transatlantic Disorder or Just a Different Order?

Interestingly enough, with the exception of Charles Kupchan, none of the authors in this volume seem to take the “breakdown” scenario too seriously. ADD Kupchan’s argument here!

Yet, it is not at all clear even in Kupchan’s gloomy outlook what “breakdown of the transatlantic order” actually means: End of NATO, end of the security community, de-institutionalization of the relationship (note that there is not that much to “de-institutionalize” in the economic realm, as van Scherpenberg points out in his contribution)? Or does “breakdown” entail the return of the security dilemma in the transatlantic relationship including traditional balancing behavior by European countries against the U.S. or the return of strategic rivalries between the two? As Ikenberry points out in the introduction, not every “breakdown” scenario entails disorder and chaos. E.g., the return of some sort of 19th century balance of power system would imply the replacement of the transatlantic security community by another order (see Kupchan’s chapter for a discussion of breakdowns of previous international orders).

In other words, it depends a lot on one’s theoretical assumptions about the nature of international politics to which version of a transatlantic “breakdown” one subscribes. Realists, of course,
assume that a breakdown of the transatlantic partnership is both inevitable in the long run and will result in a return of the relentless logic of power balancing (for a general argument see Mearsheimer 2001). Liberals, however, would argue that even if the transatlantic security community de-institutionalizes and ultimately collapses, the “democratic peace” still prevails (cf. Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2002). As long as the U.S. and most European countries remain stable liberal democracies, they will not go to war against each other. The order will become far less cooperative, but the security dilemma will not return between the former allies. Europeans will not feel threatened by American military power and, thus, will not be tempted to revert to balancing behavior. They might even cooperate with the U.S. on an ad hoc basis to protect mutual interests in the rest of the world. And, as Michael Byers suggests, both the U.S. and Europe have a lot of stakes in maintaining the international legal order so that an end of the transatlantic alliance would not necessarily imply the end of international law. In this sense then, a liberal “breakdown” scenario would entail the replacement of one order by another, though much less institutionalized.

Last not least, a breakdown of NATO must not necessarily mean the end of the transatlantic security community. The North Atlantic Alliance certainly represents the core institution of the current transatlantic order. However, it is not synonymous with it. The four Is constituting the community – interests, interdependence, institutions, and identities – could still survive even if the current security institution is replaced by another one.

At this point, however, the “breakdown” scenario strongly resembles the transformation scenario.

Transformation and/or Adaptation: Toward a New “Transatlantic Bargain?”

Most chapters in this volume subscribe to either the transformation or the adaptation scenario. While a breakdown of the transatlantic order cannot be excluded and simply “muddling through” might not suffice to prevent it, there are many good reasons why transformation or adaptation represents the more likely outcome of the current crisis. First, the diagnosis of the current transatlantic
crisis itself reveals that the security community is not beyond repair. Even the value gaps and the ruptures over core interests have not given rise to strong demands for a transatlantic divorce on either side of the Atlantic. Second, many of the value gaps including European anti-Americanism and the differences in the interpretation of international law and of core concepts such as sovereignty have been with us for quite some time and, thus, cannot as such result in breakdown (cf. chapters by Anderson, Byers, Fuchs/Klingemann, Görtemaker, and Hall). In the absence of triggering events, these continuing differences are held in check by other factors that keep the community together. Third, from a normative point of view, enduring transatlantic cooperation is not only needed to keep the community alive. It is also hard to see how contemporary world order and global security problems can be solved without strong U.S.-European cooperation. The disputes over the ICC or the Kyoto Protocol demonstrate that neither progress in human rights nor in environmental matters can be achieved without transatlantic cooperation.

Yet, most authors in this volume also agree that pro-active engagement is necessary to overcome the current transatlantic crisis. At a minimum, this would mean adapting the existing institutional framework of the community to the new post-Cold War realities including the new security environment. But it might also entail that we need a new “transatlantic bargain” resulting in a transformation of the fundamental norms and institutions of the community (see Moravcsik 2003; Risse 2003b). What would the “adaptation” and “transformation” scenarios mean in detail?

Adaptation of NATO, for example, requires the acknowledgement of two facts of life in the transatlantic world: that U.S. military power will be unmitigated for the foreseeable future and that the EU is rising as a foreign policy actor in its own right. As a result, Europeans would have to adjust to the reality that the U.S. needs NATO much less for its security needs than was the case in the past and that, therefore, there might be circumstances in the future in which the U.S. will act alone rather than through NATO. The U.S. needs to realize that acting alone does not mean unilateralism. Both sides would then have to re-affirm the consultation rules of NATO including the requirement
that the North Atlantic Council discusses upcoming conflicts before national governments take a firm stance. In this context, adaptation might also require that NATO assumes a much more active and more integrated “out of area” role than is currently the case.

Furthermore, adaptation of NATO means that the institutional links with the EU and its foreign policy apparatus have to be improved (for details see Haftendorn 2005). This does not only refer to the institutions of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), but to the EU’s foreign policy role more generally. When it comes to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace-building, the EU has many more instruments at its disposal than NATO. A comprehensive transatlantic security strategy requires much closer coordination between NATO and the EU than is the case today.

As Jens van Scherpenberg points out in his chapter, the current institutional structure to deal with transatlantic economic disputes is rather weak. While it might not be necessary to create a new U.S.-EU institution, adaptation means in this context that instruments such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) will have to be revitalized as an early-warning system of transatlantic trade conflicts before they break out or are brought to the WTO.

But what if adaptation is not enough and transformation becomes necessary to save the transatlantic security community? What would a new “transatlantic bargain” mean? Such a new bargain would have to start with the acknowledgement that the current transatlantic institutional framework is still a Cold War leftover which has not yet taken into account the new security reality, particularly not the post-9/11 world. A new bargain would have to start with reforming the constitutive norms of the transatlantic order:

1. **Multilateralism vs. “Coalitions of the Willing:”** The U.S. approach according to which the “mission defines the coalition” spells the end of the security alliance. It is unilateralism in disguise. In that sense, the U.S. would have to re-affirm transatlantic multilateralism and the enduring partnership with Europe, if the security community is to survive. At the same time, Euro-
pean NATO members must accept that the U.S. sometimes will have to “go it alone” and that transatlantic consensus will not always be possible (see above). Thus, there needs to be an institutionalized mechanism spelling out what it means “to agree to disagree” and when the U.S. is no longer bound by NATO rules. One possibility would be to create “à la carte” options inside NATO rather than outside the security alliance.

2. *International Law and Effective Multilateralism:* As Michael Byers argues in his chapter, both Europe and the U.S. have a lot at stake in international law. However, this mutual commitment to international law and to effective multilateralism needs to be re-affirmed. Given the differences in the two security strategies that have been in put in place by the U.S. and the EU (cf. President of the United States 2002; European Council 2003), a new transatlantic bargain must entail some ground rules concerning “out-of-area” military interventions:

- There should be a clear commitment by the transatlantic community to first seek approval by the UN Security Council for any “out of area” intervention. That is, transatlantic multilateralism must be embedded in a global multilateral order. This, however, begs the question how to enact the “responsibility to protect” if veto powers in the Security Council object (as was the case in the Kosovo 1999). Neither NATO nor the U.S. nor Europe can forfeit their humanitarian obligations, just because Russia or China object to their proposed action. A rule of thumb might be that it makes a huge differences whether just one of the veto powers object or whether a UN Security Council majority refuses to legitimize military action. In the latter case, the commitment to uphold international law (see above) must take precedence over transatlantic security interests.

- Effective multilateralism also requires a joint understanding of what kind of military action is legitimized by Art. 51 of the UN Charter. While there seems to be a consensus among international lawyers that Art. 51 legitimizes pre-emptive military strikes (see Michael Byers’ chapter), the controversy really centers around the notion of preventive action. Or, to put it
more precisely: Where does pre-emption end and preventive war begin? And what do these notions mean in light of the new security threats, e.g. transnational terrorism with weapons of mass destruction? How far can one push the interpretation of Art. 51 without blurring the difference between self-defense and offensive warfare which would be disastrous for international law?

The transformation scenario would not stop with reforming the norms governing the transatlantic relationship. Rather, transformation also requires changing the institutional framework of the order. In this context, some tough questions would have to be asked about NATO (for the “adaptation” scenario see above):

1. Is NATO still institutionally adequate for transatlantic alliance management? Does it make sense to keep NATO’s institutional framework when all future European NATO members will be members of the EU, too (if Turkey joins, of course) and when the EU upgrades its foreign policy in the way foreseen, e.g., in the Constitutional Treaty, including ESDP? What about a true “two pillar” NATO, with a North American and a European pillar, respectively? Of course, an EU caucus inside NATO would imply a fundamental transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance’s political organization. And the EU would have to develop effective and credible military forces.

2. What about the future of NATO as a military organization? To what extent can it deal with new security threats such as failing and failed states, transnational terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Once again, it should be noted here that the “new security agenda” requires a comprehensive strategy integrating political and military means. At present, NATO does not have the political instruments necessary for state-building, post-conflict peace-building, democratization, and the like. The EU’s foreign policy apparatus is much better equipped to deal with these political security tasks. Yet, it still lacks the military power to back up its diplomatic strength. Transformation would require to improve drastically on the institu-
tionalized relationship between NATO’s military organization and the EU’s political mechanisms.

Transformation would also require to tackle the problems of the transatlantic economic order, as outlined by van Scherpenberg’s chapter. Currently, there is no formal institutional framework outside the WTO to deal with transatlantic economic conflicts in a systematic fashion. A transformation scenario would probably require to go beyond a revival of the TABD (see above) and to create a U.S.-EU institutional framework to tackle economic conflicts before they have to be adjudicated at the WTO’s dispute settlement system. This is particularly significant, since the most severe transatlantic trade problems are located at the intersection of economy and security (see van Scherpenberg’s chapter).

6. Concluding Remarks

The Western order is experiencing a severe crisis, but it is not beyond repair. This conclusion can be drawn from most chapters in this volume. The West is in crisis, mainly because policy conflicts pertain to core interests of either side, cover a whole range of issues, and are, thus, no longer confined to one policy field such as international security. While the transatlantic economic ties remain strong, they cannot and will not serve as a “super-glue” to keep the political relationship together. As to NATO as the core transatlantic security institution, its political framework is not functioning well at all, while the military organization has better adjusted to the new environment than many would have predicted. As to constitutive norms of the international order, the West still shares a commitment to international law (while fighting over significant differences in interpretation), even though notions such as sovereignty are understood very differently. Last not least, the West still exists in terms of collectively shared common values, but this collective identity has enduring fissures that can be easily cracked open and lead to confrontation through some triggering event.
I conclude from these interpretations that allowing the crisis to linger on by papering over the differences probably will not suffice. Rather, a new “transatlantic bargain” is required (the “transformation” scenario spelled out above) that re-visits both the underlying norms that are constitutive for the Western security community and its institutional framework. This concerns, first of all, NATO’s political arrangements that have suffered severe damages during the past years. But we also need stronger institutional ties between the two economic giants in the contemporary world order, the U.S. and the EU.

A final breakdown of the Western community would be disastrous for world order and global governance. Governing the global economy, tackling global security issues such as state failure, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational terrorism, dealing with the rise of China in global politics, preserving the global environment, and promoting democracy, human rights, and global justice – it is unthinkable that any of these challenges can be handled without close transatlantic cooperation. However, pro-active engagement in the U.S. and in Europe is required to prevent the Western order from breaking down.
References


